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LEGISLATOR JUDGES
The Warren Court and Justices' Use of State or
International Policies in Criminal Procedure Cases
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Warren Court went to great lengths to expand criminal defendants' rights, and in doing so it frequently
relied on state majoritarian institutions' policies or international norms to accomplish its goals. The Court
and justices were almost twice as likely to use state laws than international policies in their reasoning
The Court was also almost two-and-a-half times more likely to use state or international policies in
its rationale when deciding in favor of the criminal defendant in relation to the state's interest.
by JOHN R. HERMANN
In Trap

v.

Dulles (1958), the U.S.

The Court used international laws

Supreme Court decided that a native

to determine

born American's citizenship could

standards of decency" were: "The

not be revoked by a court-martial

civilized nations of the world are

under the

what the

"evolving

Eighth Amendment of

in virtual unanimity that stateless

the United States Constitution. To

ness is not to be imposed as punish

discern whether the court-martial

ment for crime ....The United Nations'

was constitutional, the

Court did

survey of the nationality laws of 84

not rely solely on the Constitution.

nations of the world reveals that only

Instead, the Court mused that, "The

two countries, the Phillippines and

[Eighth] Amendment must draw its

Turkey, impose denationalization as

meaning from the evolving stan

a penalty for desertion.''2

dards of decency that mark the

The Warren Court's use of state or

progress of a maturing society."1

international policies is not limited

I would like to thank Alex Gallin-Parisi at
Trinity University for her assistance on my initial
literature review. David Crockett at Trinity
University also deserves special gratitude for
reading a rough draft of this manuscript. Chris
Nicholson at University of Houston made invalu
able suggestions as the discussant of my panel
at the 2013 Southern Political Science Associa

·

tion. Finally, I am indebted to Rorie Spill Solberg
(Editor) and the anonymous reviewers for their
comments on this research project.
1. 356 U.S. 86. 101 (1958). While the Trop Court
enunciated the words ..evolving standards of
decency," the Warren Court is just paraphras
ing the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910), embracing the notion of a living
Constitution.
2. Id. at l02·l03.
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to

its

Eighth

Amendment

juris

vidual over state interests?

prudence.3 The Warren Court also

majoritarian force in our system ....

The answers to these two ques

[W ]hen the Supreme Court declares

international

tions are important because, while

unconstitutional a legislative act or

policies in some of its most impor

it is well chronicled that the Warren

the action of an elected executive,

tant criminal procedure cases. In

Court sided with the individual over

it thwarts the will of the represen

for example,

the government in criminal proce

tatives of the actual people of here

Wolf

dure cases, little is known about

and now; it exercises control, not in

Both cases dealt

how the Court justified its decisions.

behalf of the prevailing majority, but

with the Fourth Amendment's exclu

If the Court and individual justices

against it."11 If the Warren Court and

considered

Mapp

v.

state

or

Ohio (1961),4

the Supreme Court overturned
v.

Colorado (1949).5

sionary rule, which holds that evi

were using state or even interna

justices considered state or inter

dence obtained illegally by the police

tional laws, did they use them to

national policies in their criminal

gain support from the majoritarian

procedure decisions, they may have

that

branches of government, indicating

reaffirmed the majority's wishes.

the exclusionary rule does not apply

the judiciary's inherent weakness

Several scholars have raised con

Mapp Court rea
in 1949, prior to

in the American political system?

cerns that the justices of the Warren

Equally important, did the Court and

Court

almost two-thirds of

justices use state or international

powers that belong to the legisla

the States were opposed to the use

laws in their reasoning based on the

ture and states, violating separation

of the exclusionary rule, now, despite

attitudinal or legal models of deci

of powers and federalism, respec

Wolfcase, more than half of those

sion making? If so, then the Court

tively.12

since passing upon it, by their own

and justices' use of state or inter

example, muses that "the Warren
Court had to perform a transform

is inadmissible in a court of law. In

Wolf decision

overturning the

to the states, the
soned that "while
the

Lhe

Wolf case,

assumed

Bernard

policy-making

Schwartz,

for

legislative or judicial decision, have

national laws are simply post hoc

whole or partly adopted or adhered

reasoning and thus symbolic. The

ing role, usually thought of as more

Weeks [exclusionary] rule."6
Additionally, in Miranda v. Arizona
(1966),7 the Court mandated that

Court and justices may have needed

appropriate to the legislator than

to legitimize their preferred policy

the judge."13 These same justices

positions by citing state and interna

have also been accused of setting an

police notify suspects of their Fifth

tional policies.

to the

independent moral agenda.14 Again,

Amendment right from self-incrim

if the Warren Court used a version

ination and Sixth Amendment right

legislator Judges and Their legacy

of a majoritarian process (i.e., con

to counsel. A key part of the Court's

Understanding

sidering

reasoning in Miranda involved exam

and justices' use of state or interna

in

ining

the Warren

Court

a

state/international

counter-majoritarian

laws)
fashion

policies

tional policies in their decisions is

(i.e., judicial review), it may have

on the issue. In addition to explor

important for several reasons. First,

been affirming many of the electoral

ing English common law, the Court

the counter-majoritarian role that

branch policies even when striking

found that "Scottish judicial deci

the Supreme Court can play in the

down laws as unconstitutional.

sions bar use in evidence of most

American political system is one of

confessions obtained through police

the most prominent debates attract

criminal

interrogation."8 The Court continued

ing Supreme Court scholars.1° In

worthy of analysis because they left

foreign

countries'

The

In addition, the Warren Court's
procedure

decisions

are

by stating that "in India [and Ceylon],

Least Dangerous Branch,

confessions made to police not in the

Bickel explains "the root difficulty

every citizen's rights. The Warren

presence of a magistrate have been

is that judicial review is a counter-

Court

Alexander

an

indelible imprint
transformed

on
the

virtually
criminal

justice system by favoring criminal

excluded."9
Clearly, the Warren Court relied
on state or international laws in its
decision making in these high-profile
criminal procedure cases. Yet, the
extent to which these same justices
imported state or international stan
dards into federal law in their path
breaking

criminal

jurisprudence

remains unclear. This study seeks
to answer two questions: First, how
frequently did the Warren Court and
justices rely on state or international
laws when making decisions? And,
second, was the Warren Court more
likely to use state or international
laws when ruling in favor of the indi-
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3. It is important to note that I am not imply
ing that the Court Is using the "evolving of stan·
<lards of decency" doctrine here. This doctrine
did not formally become precedent until Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. L53 (1976). The "evolving
standards of decency" doctrine, moreover, only
applies to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6. 367 U.S. 643, 65l (1961).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Id. at 488.
9. Id. at 488-489.
10. Da hl. Decision Moking in a Democracy, 16
). Pua. L. 287 (1957): ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Jonathan D.
Casper. The Supreme Court & Notional Policy
Making, 70 A.P.S.R. 50 (1976); john B. Gates, Par
5.

tisan Realignment, Unconstitutionol State Policy,
and the United States Supreme Court, 31 A.J.P.S.
259 (1987).

•

VOL 97 NO 5

11.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER·

ous BRANCH

16-17 (1962); but sec, for example ,

Michael ). Klarman, Rethinking The C1v1/ Rights
Ancl Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. Rev. I
(1996); Barry Friedman. The Birth ofAn Academic
Obsession: The Nistory ofthe Countermajorltorian
Difficulty, Part Five. 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
12. BEllNAR0 SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF Tim
SUPREME COURT (1993); William J. St UlltZ, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
13. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF TllE
SUPREME COURT

14.

263 (1993).

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER·

OUS BRANCll

(1962);

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC·

RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW

(1980); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
(1987); but see Corinna Barrett Lain,

AMERICA

Countermojoritorion Nero or Zero: Rethinking the
Warren Courts Role in the Criminal Procedure
Revol11cfo11. 152 u. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004).

�

defendants' rights over the state's

in criminal procedure cases. Almost

interests in fighting crime. Bernard

SO years later in Roper

v.

Simmons

�
�

Schwartz notes that the "[p]rotec

(2005), for example, the majority

�

tion of the rights of criminal defen

held that the death penalty could

dants had become a primary concern

not be applied to juveniles under

.£
l:l

of the Warren Court."15 Moreover,

the Eighth Amendment. The Court

the

that

held that a "majority of States have

several criminal procedure clauses

rejected the imposition of the death

Warren

Court

ensured

in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

penalty on juvenile offenders under

Amendments that applied to the

18, and we now hold this is required

federal

by

government

also

applied

the

Eighth

Amendment."24

In

to the states. Some of the criminal

terms of international law, the Court

procedure issues that were selec

reasoned that "every country has

tively applied to the states via the

ratified save the United States and

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Somalia ... an

Clause during the

Warren Court

on capital punishment for crimes

Amendment's

were:

the

Fourth

the

Sixth

prohibition

committed by juveniles under 18."25

o r international policies in its rea

Ohio

Some justices do not agree that inter

soning

Amendment's

national laws should be included

There is a growing body of literature

exclusionary rule in Mapp
(1961),16

express

v.

right to counsel in Gideon

than

political

scientists.28

v. Wain
wright (1963).'7 the Fifth Amend

as part of the Court's reasoning. In

that is interested in how the Court

dissent in Roper, Associate Justice

applies state or international laws in

ment's right from self-incrimination

Antonin Scalia joined by Chief Justice

other clauses of the Constitution in

in Malloy

Hogan (1964),18 the Sixth

William H. Rehnquist and Associ-

addition to the Eighth Amendment.29

Amendment's right to confront a

ate justice Clarence Thomas harshly

Steven Winter, for example, notes

witness in Pointer

criticize the majority's decision by

that the Court used the norms and

v.

v.

Texas (1965),19

the Fifth Amendment's right from

stating that "more fundamentally,

mores of the states, municipalities,

self-incrimination, the Sixth Amend

however, the basic premise of the

and police departments in its reason

ment's right to counsel in Miranda v.
Arizona (1966),20 the Sixth Amend

American

ing of when it is appropriate for peace

law should conform to the laws of

officers to use deadly force in Tennes

the rest of the world-ought to be
rejected out of hand."26

suggests that the Court is a "popular

ment's right to a speedy trial in

Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967),21 the

Court's

argument-that

Sixth Amendment's right to a jury

see

v.

Garner (1985).30 Winter even

oracle."31 Similarly, Sheldon Bernard

What We Already Know

Lyke contends that the Court used

Most of the literature involving the

the "evolving standards of decency"

jeopardy clause in Benton v. Maryland

Court's use of state or international

doctrine in its sodomy decision in

(1969).23

laws has focused on Eighth Amend

Lawrence

Finally, in Trap the Court appeared

ment jurisprudence.27 Additionally,

vides evidence that "Lawrence can

to start a controversy over the role

legal scholars have devoted more

be read as part of the Court's Eighth

of using state and international laws

attention to the Court's use of state

Amendment evolving standards of

trial in Duncan

v.

Louisiana (1968),22

and the Fifth Amendment's double

v.

Texas (2003). Lyke pro

decency jurisprudence."32
15. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE

SUPREME COURT 281 (1993).
16. 367 U.S. 643.
17. 372 U.S. 355.

18. 378 U.S. l.
19. 380 U.S. 400.
20. 384 U.S. 436.
21. 386 U.S. 213.
22. 391 U.S. 145 .
23. 395 U.S. 784.
24. 543 U.S. 551. at 568.
25. Id. at 576.
26. Id. at 624.

27. William W. Berry, Following the Yellow Brick

Road of Evolvi11g Standards of Decency: The l1·onic
Consequences of "Death·ls·Differentjurisprudence.

28 PACE L. REV. 15 (2007); Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle

Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
l.egislation as Evidence of an Evolving National

Consensus, 84 N. CAR. L. REV. 1089 (2006); Michael
S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendmentjurispru·

dence. 31 HARV. j. Pua. L. & POL'Y 47 (2008); Tom
Stacy. Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess.
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 475 (2005); THOMAS

To date, Corina Barrett Lain has
WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION: THE STORY OF
THE DARYL ATKINS CASE (2009); but see Corinna
Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving
Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009).
28. THOMAS W1\LKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECU·
TION: THE STORY OF THE DARYL ATKINS CASE
(2009).
29. Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and
the Democratic Practice of judicial Review, 14
N YU Rr::v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679 (1986); Corinna
Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving
Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009); Sheldon
Bernard Lyke. Lawrence as an Eighth Amend
ment Cose: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards

of Decency, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633
(2009).
30. Steven L. W inter, Tennessee v. Corner and
the Democratic Practice of judicial Review, 14

NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 683-692 (1986).
31. Id. at 692.
32. Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Lawrence as an
Eig/1th Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving
StandardsofDecency, 15 WM. & MARY j. WOMEN &
L. 633. 635 (2009).

conducted the most comprehensive
study of the Court's use of state laws
in its reasoning in non-death penalty
jurisprudence. Through rich descrip
tion of individual cases, Lain demon
strates that the Court has considered
state policies in its reasoning in many
cases involving the Bill of Rights
(including

selective

incorporation)

and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Lain's central finding is that "the
Supreme Court's explicitly majoritar
ian approach to Eighth Amendment
protection is not all that different
from what the Court does in other
constitutional

contexts.
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nized that most free countries have

process to equal protection, from the

included a discussion of state or

First Amendment to the Fourth and

international laws in its reasoning,

accepted a prior conviction

Sixth, the Supreme Court routinely

including majority, concurring, and

where as a bar to a second trial in

and explicitly-determines constitu

dissenting opinions. The Court's deci

their jurisdiction."41 Third, in Duncan

tional protection based on whether

sions that focused only on state or

v.

a majoritarian of states agree with

international laws of the distant past

sidered state laws when determining
whether the Sixth Amendment's right

else

Louisiana (1968),42 the Court con

it."33 To explain the prevalence of the

were excluded (e.g., colonial period,

Court's use of state laws in its reason

laws at the Constitutional Conven

to a jury trial should be applied to the

ing, she suggests "the Court's state

tion, or international policies during

states via the Fourteenth Amend

polling exercises are not so differ

that era). Instead, the focus of this

ment Due Process Clause. According

ent from what the rest of us do when

study is on justices' use of modern

to the Court, "indeed, there appear to

making difficult decisions: we look to

examples

be only two instances, aside from the

others for guidance."34 Lain concludes

trends in state or international laws

Louisiana scheme, in which a State

that "the Supreme Court [is] living up

as part of their reasoning. At the state

denies jury trial for a crime punish

of

or

contemporaneous

to its legacy as the 'least dangerous

level, the analysis included city ordi

able by imprisonment for longer than

branch.'"35

nances, state laws, and police actions

six months.''43

While extant literature provides

that were squarely part of the consti

In terms of operationalizing the

a theoretical and descriptive frame

tutional issue. Excluded from analysis

variables, I used the following coding

work for the Court's use of state or

were state court decisions because

scheme. If there is a presence of state

international laws in its reasoning,

the Supreme Court uses state court

or international law in the reason

the issue has never been empirically

precedent frequently in its reasoning.

ing, the variable using state or inter

tested. This study seeks to empiri

At the international level, the study

national was coded 1; otherwise, the

cally examine this phenomenon in

included

analyzed

variable was coded 0. If the Court

the context of the Warren Court's

international law as a part of the

ruled in favor of the individual over

criminal procedure cases.

analysis, including court decisions.

the state, a variable was coded 1; oth

By examining any type of foreign law,

erwise, it was 0. The justices were
excluded from the analysis due to

decisions

that

Data and Methods

the Warren Court and the individual

I started with the Supreme Court

justices were showing that they were

their presence in too small a number

Database (hosted by Washington Uni

interested in international norms and

of cases.

versity, St. Louis) to find the universe

mores when crafting their decisions.

This study includes the Court and
justices'

discussion of state

laws

of cases involving criminal proce

Three examples where the jus

dure decided by the Supreme Court

tices use state or international laws

v. Dulles, Secretmy of
State (1958), and the conclusion of

in their reasoning will clarify my

both.44 The study also examines how

coding methodology. First, in Fer

frequently the Court decided to rule

the Warren Court. I began with the

guson

Georgia (1961),38 the Court

in favor of the individual over the

Trap decision because it was here that

considered the constitutionality of

state's position. To discern whether

the Court openly accepted the use of

a state law in which a defense attor

between Trap

v.

a living Constitution in justifying its

ney was prohibited from asking a

decision, providing for the possibility

defendant to testify at his own trial

of citing state or international laws

under the Sixth Amendment's right

in future decisions. Since Trop dealt

to counsel. In overturning the law, the

with a criminal issue, I focused the

Court held that "the State of Georgia

analysis on criminal procedure cases

is the only State-indeed, apparently

during this era. Cases were selected

the only jurisdiction in the common

that involved a criminal procedure

law world-to retain the common

issue and a constitutional issue when

law rule that a person charged with

the Court issued a full opinion. For

a criminal offense is incompetent to

inclusion in this study, the Court and

testify under oath in his own behalf at

justices must expressly state that the

his trial."39 The Court gave a myriad of

case involves a Fourth, Fifth (exclud

examples of each state and the many

ing the Takings Clause), Sixth, and/

nations that forbade this practice.
Second, Associate

or Eighth Amendment issue in the
decision.36 The study included cases

justice

Black's dissent in Abbate

v.

Hugo

United

examining both federal and state

States (1959)40 considered interna

laws.37 The total number of cases that

tional laws that involve the prohibi

met these criteria was 109.

tion of the Fifth Amendment's double

The 109 criminal court opinions

jeopardy clause. In his dissent, Black

were read to determine if the cases

emphasized that "it has been recog-

238
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only, international laws only, and

33. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionol·
ism of"Evolving Standards,· 57 UCLA L. REV. 365,
369 (2009).
34. Id. at 405.
35. Id. at 406.
36. Cases that involved only a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause issue were
excluded because some of the cases' definitions
were nebulous in terms of defining the exact
criminal procedure right in the Supreme Court
database.
37. I use the word "law" in this analysis to
include both legislative and police action. The
Warren Court used both legislative acts and
police actions in its decisions.
38. 365 U.S. 570.
39. Id. at 570.
40. 359 U.S. 187.
41. Id. at 203.
42. 391U.S.145.
43. Id. at 162.
44. This study recognizes that state and
international laws are relatively different. This
is why the study examines each individually.
Nonetheless, both state and international laws
serve similar purposes to the Court and indi·
victual justices in their reasoning. They both use
norms and mores or different governments
whether at the state or international level.

Frequency in Which the Warren Court and Individual Justices
Use State or International Laws in Their Reasoning
Cases, Court, and Justices

Number of Cases (total N)

justice used state or international
Percent

All Cases (state or international policies), including
majority, concurring, and dissenting dec1s1ons

26 (109)

24%

21 (109)

19%

All Cases (state policies only), including ma1onty,
concurring, and d1ssenltng decisions

Burton). With the exception of Asso
ciate Justice Goldberg (8%). every

All Cases (international policies only), including

policies in at least 12 percent of the
cases he authored or joined.
As Table 2 shows, the Court was
almost two-and-a-half times more
likely to use state or international
laws to support its reasoning when
they favored the individual over the

majority, concurring, and dissenting decisions

11

(109)

10%

Majority Decisions

20 (109)

18%

Concurring Opinions

7 (71)

international policies in 17 of the

10%

76 (22%) cases where it supported

Dissenting Opinions

12 (87)

14%

the individual. In stark contrast, the

15 (108)

14%

Court only discussed state or inter
national policies in three of the 33

Black
Burton
Brennan

l (5)

20%

19 (108)

18%

state. The Court examined states or

(9%) of the cases when it decided to
side with the state's position.

14 (72)

19%

20 (109)

18%

Frankfurter

reasonable

4 (22)

18%

Court and justices were more com

Fortas

7 (47)

15%

fortable justifying their decisions

Goldberg

2 (25)

8%

with state laws than international

15 (109)

14%

laws, perhaps because state poli

5 (28)

18%

Stewart

17 (104)

16%

Warren

18 (107)

17%

Whtie

10 (81)

12%

4 (23)

17%

Clark
Douglas

Harlan
Marshall

Whittaker

Based on the frequencies, it is
to

conclude

that

the

cies have to conform with the United
States

Constitution.

The relation

ship between the Court using state
or international policies in its ratio
nale and siding with the individual
in criminal procedure cases was not
likely to occur by chance. Using a
one-tailed t-test, this study finds that
there is only about an eight percent
probability

that this

relationship

took place because of chance. This
there was a relationship between the

of the Warren Court. The justices

finding is

Warren Court using state or interna

were almost twice as likely to use

given the low number of cases (109)

tional laws as part of its reasoning

state laws (19%) than international

under examination in this study.

even more impressive

and ruling in favor of the individual,

laws (10%) in their reasoning. The

While these data do not reveal

cross tabs and a one-tailed t-test was

majority (18%) was more likely to

with precision the reason why the

used. A t-test measures whether the

use state and/or international poli

Court is more inclined to use state or

means of two groups are statistically

cies in its reasoning in comparison to

international policies when ruling in

different from each other. It also dis

the concurring (10%) and dissenting

favor of the individual over the state,

cerns the likelihood the relationship

opinions ( 14%).

it is plausible to speculate that this

Equally interesting, Table 1 also

propensity is related to the Court's

chance.

reveals that every justice that served

lack of enforcement powers. This

during the time period and included

proposition is echoed in Federalist 78

Results

in this study was willing to use state

when Alexander Hamilton states that

between two variables occurred by

As evidenced in Table 1, the major

or international policies in his rea

the Court "may have truly be said to

ity, concurring, and/or dissenting

soning. In their opinions, not one

have neither FORCE nor WILL but

opinions mentioned state or inter

justice

opposition

merely judgment ....lt proves incon

national policies almost a quarter

to the Court's use of state or inter

testably that the judiciary is beyond

(24%) ofthe time in the 109 criminal

national laws in its reasoning. The

comparison the weakest of the three

procedure cases decided between

justices' discussion of state or inter

departments of power, that it can

national

never attack with success either of

Trop v. Dulles and the conclusion

45. ALEXANDER

HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDER·

ALIST PAPERS 465-466

(1961).

expressed

policies

any

ranged between

a low of eight percent (Associate

the other two; and that all possible is

Justice Arthur Goldberg) to a high of

requisite to enable it to defend itself

20 percent (Associate Justice Harold

against their attacks."45 Additionally,
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it is likely that the justices strategi

Relationship Between the Maj ority Opinion Using State and/or

cally use state or international laws

International Policies & Ruling for the Individual Over the State

to justify their decisions in a post
hoc way to aid in justifying their

Rules in Favor
of the State policy

Rules in Favor
of the Individual

Total

3

17

20

Does Not Use State/International Policies

30

59

89

state interest, the Court frequently

Total

33

76

109

justifies its decisions to override the

I-test: 0.08 (one-lailed)

preferred policy preferences or in

Court

setting precedent. By using state or

Uses State/International Policies

international policies when ruling
in favor of the individual over the

government by taking into consid
eration the policies of other elected
branches and the norms of the inter
national community.

Conclusion

ings support Lain's conclusions-at

In the 109 criminal procedure cases

least in terms of the Court justifying

Rehnquist, and/or Roberts Courts

decided between the Court's decision

its decisions based on majoritarian

engage in similar behavior. In addi

in Trop

should focus on whether the Burger,

Dulles and the conclusion of

policies. As Dahl said so long ago, the

tion to criminal procedure cases,

the Warren Court, 24 percent of the

Court tends to follow the election

future research also is needed in

majority, concurring, or dissenting

returns. 54

other issue areas. For example, do

v.

opinions used state or international

Gerald N. Rosenberg contends that

the Supreme Court and its justices

laws as part of their reasoning. Every

courts do not have the ability to bring

also use state or international poli
cies in First Amendment, Equal Pro

justice used state or international

about independent

policies in his reasoning at some

without broad extra-legal forces sup

tection Clause, and privacy doctrine

point in the time period. The Court

porting its decisions.ss As evidenced

cases? In other words, we need to

was

almost two-and-a-half

social

change

times

by my findings, the Warren Court

investigate if the use of majoritar

more likely to use state or interna

appears to justify some of its crimi

ian decisions is a common method of

tional policies in its rationale when

nal procedure decisions by trends in

softening the rejection or invalida

deciding in favor of the criminal

state laws, supporting the idea that

tion of a state or federal law. *

defendant against the state's inter

extra-legal forces were already in the

est.

works.

While the Warren Court went to

Even though this study offers evi

great lengths to expand criminal

dence that the Warren Court's deci

defendants' rights based upon its

sions used state or international

conception of "the American scheme

policies in their reasoning, we cannot

of justice,"46 it frequently relied on

assert with certainty that the Court's

majoritarian institutions' policies or

concern for majoritarian policies was

international norms to accomplish

the sole determinant of its reason

its goals. Such behavior indicates

ing. The justices likely relied on legal

that the Warren Court was con

precedent and their own policy pref

cerned with support of its decisions

erences when reaching these deci

from other branches of government.

sions. This study does demonstrate,

More importantly, we can conclude

however, that the justices clearly

that the Warren Court's criminal pro

relied on state or international poli

cedure decisions may not be as coun

cies to justify a large swath of their
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procedure

v.
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sions.
Given the limited scope of this

Lain concludes that "we see the Court

study-the justices' use of state or

as impervious to majoritarian pres

international policies in the crimi

sures when, in fact, nothing could be

nal procedure cases decided by the

further from the truth.''53 My find-

Warren
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